Comments by Nuclear Energy Information Service (NEIS)

Regarding NRC Proposed Rule, “Licensing Requirements for Microreactors and Other

Reactors With Comparable Risk Profiles”

Docket ID NRC-2025-0379; 91 Fed. Reg. 23,628 (May 1, 2026)

Submitted June 15, 2026 via Federal eRulemaking Portal

Nuclear Energy Information Service is a Chicago-based safe-energy advocacy, nuclear power watchdog environmental organization.  NEIS opposes the continued deployment of nuclear power in an energy landscape that has amply demonstrated the presence and effectiveness of cheaper, more quickly deployable, and superiorly cost-effective means of providing electric power.

NEIS hereby adopts, supports and incorporates by reference the comments submitted by the Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS; dated June 15, 2026) and those of the Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection (DEEP, dated Feb. 2026), including DEEP’s request for a 45-day extension of the public comment period, unreasonably denied without justification on May 1, 2026.

In addition, NEIS provides the following comments.  Taken together, NEIS supports the contention made by other commenters that this Proposed Rulemaking should be terminated.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS:

• Validity of promulgating directives is challengeable:

NRC lists as its reasons for issuing this Proposed Rulemaking clauses from the ADVANCE Act, and the Presidential E.O. 14154 (90 FR 8353; January 29, 2025), titled, “Unleashing American Energy,” with an objective of unleashing “America’s affordable and reliable energy and natural resources;” as well as E.O 14300.

While the directives from the ADVANCE Act may be defensible from a regulatory, engineering and technological standpoint, those of the E.O.s are not.

For example, micro reactors and related small modular nuclear reactors (SMNRs) are not yet shown to be either “affordable (or) reliable,” largely because they do not yet exist in significant enough numbers to support this contention.  Even preliminary SMNR costs have escalated well beyond initial optimistic marketing values (e.g., NuScale/UAMPS debacle of 2023-24).  The President’s declaration of a “National Energy Emergency” has yet to be verified in any credible, reality-based manner, casting serous doubt on its validity as a basis for the changes proposed in the E.Os.

• Numerous references to “self-regulation”:

Sections that call for “licensee-defined design and quality assurance criteria,” significant flexibility in safety classification, and reduced reliance on deterministic safety principles such as the single-failure criterion are tantamount to de facto industry self-regulation.

It would be wise to recall the dangerous history of this abdication of regulatory responsibility and accountability and its effects on the public and the environment:

• The determination that lack of FAA regulatory oversight allowing Boeing to largely self-supervise its own design and operational procedures was responsible for two fatal crashes;
• Acknowledgement that railroad lobbyists opposing vital train safety regulation led to the East Palestine train derailment and subsequent chemical fire;
• Recalling that, “The … Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident was the result of collusion between the government, the regulators and Tepco, and the lack of governance by said parties,” according to the National Diet of Japan official report, Executive summary of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, June 2012, p. 16.

The broad “… proposed rule [that] would provide flexible licensing pathways with streamlined requirements… to enable a broad spectrum of deployment models,” is likely to result in virtually no meaningful regulation at all, given the current large numbers of proposed designs, and the NRC’s and Administration’s goals of rapid deployment.

• Significant systemic safety concerns not sufficiently addressed:

Emphasis on speed (actually haste) and genericization is an unacceptable combination that contains the elements of potential disaster.  Among these are:

• “Microreactors and Other Reactors with Comparable Risk Profiles” exist in a world vastly different from that which ushered in the Age of Large-Scale Reactors. While the design goal of a safer reactor is highly desirable, not only does it remain a goal until actually demonstrated, it should not be the presumption on which to discard the “defense in depth” philosophy that has been the industry-proclaimed hallmark of nuclear power operations to date.  To make that egregious error of logic is a techno-hubris that places the public and environment at great risk.  Some examples of this dangerous and flawed thinking include:
• Designs that will no longer require some form of containment, both for stationary and mobile designs
• Termination of emergency planning zones and procedures
• Reduced operational personnel, with the expectation they will operate multiple units; or worse, “autonomous function” operations (particularly if it is based on A/I technology of speculative performance capability for these functions).
• Insufficiently considered safety elements:
• Multiple designs, no matter how generic, will be placed in varied operational conditions and for varied purposes which may have impacts on operation that differ from site to site, as well as among designs;
• Widespread dissemination of micro- or SMNRs will be operated under diverse environmental conditions, such as local geography, climate and weather, and now the increased frequency and intensity of adverse weather phenomenon – all of which must be factored into safety considerations;
• The “Age of the Drone” and its effects on safety and security have been amply demonstrated in Ukraine and the Middle East. We submit that even undergrounding of reactors would have been of little safety value in Mariupol or Gaza.  Release of radioactive contents of micro- and SMNRs through use of drone warheads cannot be ruled out.  This is of particular concern with designs that will be running on HALEU fuel, or are sodium or helium cooled.  The increased radiologic inventory from a HALEU release, and the vulnerability and subsequent chemical hazards from a loss of the proposed coolants create unique radiologic and chemical hazards that must be designed against.  This vulnerability may be of even greater concern during the transportation of micro- and SMNR reactors to their designated final destinations.
• This point was made abundantly clear by national security expert, Brig. Gen Chris King (retired) during a nuclear power debate held on Pacifica Radio in 2023. King’s response to the notion of numerous, mobile micro-reactors distributed all over the country was revealing:

“How do I protect and ensure the safety of those [SMNRs] from an external threat? And the more [reactors] you got, the harder it is to protect…If there’s a thousand of those scattered around, and someone’s moving them around at their own choosing, that’s a significant threat…

“That’s very, very risky from a force protection, from a national security standpoint.  It would be very difficult to achieve national security goals in that domain.”

     –Brig. General Wendell Chris King, retired, Dean Emeritus, U.S. Army Commander, General Staff College, Aug. 15, 2023, “Climate Hour”, Pacifica Radio–

4.)  Once again – the radioactive waste:

While much attention has been given to promoting these new reactor designs, we do not see comparable attention paid to the additional amounts of radioactive waste they will add to the >100,000 tons of high-level radioactive waste (HLRW) already accumulated in the U.S – with no disposal occurring to date.

Worse, the proposed use of HALEU, as well as the multiplicity of designs creates new and previously non-existent radwaste problems, both terms of the change in core inventories, and the creation of new and non-traditional forms in which the waste will occur.  All of this complicates the final disposal plans for HLRW.

For the above reasons, and particularly given the denial of an extended comment period, NEIS urges the NRC to terminate this Proposed Rulemaking process.

We thank you for your consideration.

David A. Kraft, Director

Nuclear Energy Information Service (NEIS)

3411 W. Diversey, Ste. 13

Chicago, IL  60647

(773)342-7650

neis@neis.org